Property Dualism is a type of dualism that tries to explain mental states by prior physical brain states, but it fails to account for mental states being their own thing. This type of dualism starts to beg the question when it tries to explain mental states by physical properties. It’s an inconsistent view that in all reality implicitly states that our mental states are really illusory because they are just physical states that our brain is in. This next section is an argument against both Property Dualism and Scientific Naturalism.
Is Scientific Naturalism Reasonable?
According to the naturalist, scientific naturalism is the most reasonable worldview that one can hold. As we will learn later, free will doesn’t exist on this worldview, so no can choose to hold to scientific naturalism as the most reasonable or rational worldview. Reason is the application of the laws of logic and their application to arguments. Where do the laws of logic come from? Clearly, they do not come from matter, space, or time. They come from mental states that recognize the logical absolutes like the law of non-contradiction. Another is the law of identify, which states that if A has the same properties or attributes to B, then A is B. There are more of these absolute logical laws that can only be found in mental states, or minds that observe something. Do we have minds on scientific naturalism? The short answer is no, mainly due to the fact the mental states are not the same as brain states. If I think of a pink elephant, there is no brain state that can tell you that I am thinking about the pink elephant. I have to tell you that because my mental states are private, and my brain states are public (Turek, 32-38).
Essentially, my argument is that mental states are required for logical absolutes, and on scientific naturalism, matter is all there is. No matter how many times we rearrange matter, we will not get mental states based on the law of identity forbidding this. Atoms, Quarks, and energy don’t have beliefs, thoughts, or decisions which are all forms of mental states. For the sake of arguments, I’ll grant that property dualism is possibly on scientific naturalism. This is the view that mental states arise from brain states. Francis Crick wrote this one time: “The Astonishing Hypothesis is that my scientific conclusions that I write this book are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules (Turek, 40).” Francis Crick was a brilliant man and helped the discovery of DNA. Yet, he held to such a self-defeating worldview because it shots itself in the foot. If are our beliefs are just the result of atoms in a certain assembly, then why trust them? A different assembly would produce different beliefs making them no tool to truth. He held to the view that Scientific Naturalism is false and Crick came to a different conclusion based on his nerve assembly. Why is your nerve assembly better than mine? I think scientific naturalism leads us to a type of assembly relativism. Your truth is your truth and my truth is my truth because we have different brain states that determine our own truths. Scientific Naturalism cannot be true because there is no objective way to determine it to be true (Turek, 40-45).
Scientific Naturalism is not reasonable because reason doesn’t exist on this view of the world. Logic is dead on scientific naturalism, so what’s the point. This radical view is the end of reason. While an unembodied mind like God, is the most reasonable inference to the evidence to account for first cause uncaused of mind that logical absolutes are contingent upon. Theism is the most reasonable position to take if you want to believe the most reasonable position since it accounts for the logical absolutes that we know exist. The most committed, consistent naturalists will argue that consciousness doesn’t exist, but one ought to wonder if they consciously came to that position. Scientific Naturalism is ultimately not reasonable because it doesn’t allow for reason or mental states to exist (Turek, 52-53).
I Think, Therefore Scientific Naturalism is False
Intentionality is a philosophical term that is basically the philosophical way of describing consciousness. Is matter aware? Does matter contain mind? As we discussed earlier atoms, quarks, and lumps of matter do not contain Consciousness. How can we think if we just arranged matter in motion? Mind is where we get intentionality and this cannot be obtained through matter by being arranged a certain way. Free will is required to make intentional statements and so on. I have to be free to intentionally say that scientific naturalism is the correct view of the world. Also, to decide whether a position is more rational requires you to choose between the competing worldview. Mind cannot arise from matter, but is the other way around (will be shown in my final argument). To hold to materialism will lead to materialist relativism, which I described earlier as the view that truth is determined on the brain state. If our mental states are just brain states, then we do not have free will, mind, or intentionality. Descartes famous saying “I think; therefore, I am” is one of the most famous quotes from modernity. There is truth to this phrase because it is self-evident that we are selfs and have minds. Mind cannot arise from matter, because it would not truly be mind. I think, therefore Scientific Naturalism cannot be truth, but is indeed false (Turek, 74-85).
We all believe that we have free will to the degree of making our own decisions, but not control over where we are born geographically. On scientific naturalism, I can’t even make my own decisions. This is what Sam Harris would argue for, that free will is just an illusion. I’m not talking about controlling your own ethnicity or gender, but rather your own mental states, which are determined by our brain states. We’ve established already that mental states can’t exist on the materialistic worldview of scientific naturalism. Every material thing has a prior material cause so free agency is caused by that prior material cause not making it free. This is the short view of determinism, which states that everything is determined by its prior cause. Obviously, on scientific naturalism, materialism, determinism is not compatible view with free will since everything is matter in time and space (Turek, 42-45)
Mental states are not material and are their own things that are not determined by prior material things. Mental states by definition would be the true causes of free will since they come from mind. The things that we think are not determined by material, but rather when the mind perceives material things and reflect on these experiences, which allow us to think for ourselves. On scientific naturalism, we are not free thinkers, but rather what we think is determined (Turek, 60-65).
1. “Is the Soul Biblical?”, 3.
2. “Scientific Naturalism”, 4-5.
3. “Scientific Naturalism”, 6-7.